

# how Alice can protect her data a cryptographic approach

30 juin 2015  
SEC2 2015

Sébastien Canard



## let me introduce you Alice...



she has a smartphone

she works for a small company

she likes using new technologies... **but not at any price**

### cloud computing

in France<sup>(\*\*)</sup>

**29% of companies use cloud computing**

**5000 M€ in 2014 (+100% in 2 years)**

IaaS, PaaS, SaaS services

storage and/or compute

**can Alice make use these services in trust?**



## confidentiality of her companies' data

to protect and preserve the **confidentiality** of information means to ensure that it is **not made available** or disclosed to **unauthorized** entities

cloud services need to manipulate sensitive data

administrative documents

sensitive data related to competitiveness

what a cloud service provider can do to give confidence?

**do they have access to the data...**

...while ensuring a good and appropriate service?



## protection of her privacy

in France, cloud services should work in accordance to the “loi informatique et liberté”

- **transparency** of the data gathering
- use of the data should be **clear**
- relevant** data gathering
- data **precision**
- right to **oblivion**

what a cloud service provider can do to give confidence?

**provide solutions to protect the privacy of customers**

how to protect the privacy of customers...

... while offering them the best possible service?

what about privacy w.r.t. these providers?



# can cryptography be useful?



## historical objectives

confidentiality

(data) authentication

integrity

non repudiation


## new objectives

provide tools to obtain **conflicting properties**

including **data protection**

## computations on encrypted data?

# the concept of blind storage




## data storage

sensitive documents, administrative documents  
personal data, ...

**confidentiality** of data  $\Rightarrow$  encryption of the data

the host server **CANNOT** obtain the data in clear

it stores the data « **in blind** »



## but what if Alice needs services on her data?

**share** of data,

between devices, people/collaborators

with the administration

in a hierarchical structure

inside a group

word indexation,

to make a **search** on documents related to a keyword

or more **complicated** computations

spam filtering, targeted advertising and pricing, medical applications, private “Google”  
search, code compiling, ...

we need encryption schemes with new features


## operations on encrypted data

### conventional encryption



what if the treatment could not be performed by the same entity?  
the latter obtains the information in clear

**(fully) homomorphic encryption** allows to perform computations on plaintexts while manipulating only the corresponding ciphertexts



example: addition of encrypted data without ever decrypting them!



## any kind of treatment

addition  $\Rightarrow$  secret ballot elections

means / statistics  $\Rightarrow$  medical applications

word search  $\Rightarrow$  spam filtering , private Google search

greater than  $\Rightarrow$  sealed-bid auctions

comparison  $\Rightarrow$  private database queries

code compiling  $\Rightarrow$  cloud computing



current homomorphic encryption schemes support either addition or multiplication but not both!

**fully homomorphic encryption** schemes can handle both operations on encrypted data and thus perform **arbitrary computations**.

## can (fully) homomorphic encryption be practical?

(\*)source Coron et al., Eurocrypt 2012

security parameter	public key size	multiplication	bootstrapping
52 bits	1692 KB	0.59 sec	100 sec
62 bits	7.9 MB	9.1 sec	30 min
72 bits	18 MB	41 sec	2 h 30 min

partially homomorphic encryption (in comparison)

supports only addition (Paillier) or multiplication (ElGamal)

size of the public key: less than 1 kb

time for a treatment : some ms

in practice, do we really need fully homomorphism?

} 128 bits of security

## how to improve the efficiency

parameters of the scheme can depend on the evaluated circuit's depth

notion of **leveled FHE**

no more need to use a bootstrapping

best implementations necessitates **nearly 1 sec** for a **128 bits security** level<sup>(\*)</sup>

but loss of **generality**

need to know a priori an upper bound of the circuit depth

## can we do even better?

proxy re-  
encryption

broadcast  
encryption

identity  
based  
encryption

attribute  
based  
encryption

functional  
encryption

searchable  
encryption

distributed  
decryption

...

## possible solutions to share data

### SHARE OF THE KEY



- security hole if key compromising
- such compromising necessitates a key update for all authorized devices


### DUPLICATION OF FILES



- good security, less flexibility
- a lot of keys to manage
- additional work when withdrawing an access right

vs.

### PROXY RE-ENCRYPTION



- + lost of a device
- + fine-grained rights



- best alliance of security and flexibility

## concept of proxy re-encryption



based on a public key encryption system

a **public key** to encrypt data

a **private key** to decrypt data

additional role (a blind storage back-end)

transform a message encrypted for Alice into a message encrypted for Bob

**if Alice agrees**

without obtaining **any knowledge** on Alice and Bob's **keys**


without obtaining **any knowledge** of the encrypted **message**

for this purpose, manage a particular cryptographic **re-encryption key**


we encrypt an data specific secret key to manage big files

# main steps


upload/encrypt




share



download/re-encrypt



download/decrypt



## expected security

the decryption key is not shared between several devices

the data is not duplicated on servers

the owner is contacted **only once** for the creation of the re-encryption keys

the cloud storage provider is not **trust**

no need to know **a priori** the persons with which you will share data

each device owns a key pair

the private key never goes outside the device

the data is **never sent outside a device** in a non-encrypted form





## some possible additional features

### multi-device setting

share with a group of devices

share with other users

### fine grain management of the rights


to manage files and folders

possibility to share a document **with a group**

what about a practical **implementation?**

performances: **10% loss** w.r.t. no encryption

about 10 ms for encryption/decryption in a modern smartphone



## legal aspects

the case of a digital safe from the CNIL point of view

the service provide should **not have access** to the data


**obligation to give the data** if requested by legal authorities

it seems contradictory

but cryptography can help

possibility to share a “file opening” with authorities

no unique actor can obtain the data in clear



## conclusion



the way to **efficiently** protect the sensitive and personal data of Alice in cloud computing is now **a reality**

**cryptography** can help

- adaptive solutions

- efficient implementations

- big companies are working (IBM, Microsoft, Orange, ...)

the professional world seems more ready

- but they do not want to lose their useful services

**we need to show how powerful cryptography is...**

**thank you**

